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標題: The Impact of Introducing the Internet channel on Vertical Strategic Interaction
作者: Chen, Ching-Hong
關鍵字: internet channel;網路通路;bargaining power;customer acceptance of a internet channel;price discrimination strategy;議價力;網路通路的顧客接受度;差別取價策略
出版社: 企業管理學系所
引用: 一、中文部分 陳其美、周善瑜、蕭櫓、陳碧麗,2007。競爭廠商之產品策略與網路通路策略,管理學報,第二十四卷第二期,113-134。 蔡翼擎 (民94年1月26日)。〈管理新挑戰〉通路21世紀關鍵資源。經濟日報,第A16版。 周文卿(民95年10月)。2006年台灣網路消費行為調查分析。資策會市場情報中心。 二、英文部分 Alba, J., Lynch, J., Weitz, B., Janiszewski, C., Lutz, R., Sawyer, S., Wood, S. (1997). Interactive Home Shopping: Consumer, Retailer, and Manufactuer Incentives to Participate in Electronic Marketplaces, Journal of Marketing, 6(July), 38-53. Balasubramanian, S. (1998). Mail versus mall: A strategic analysis of competition between direct marketers and conventional retailers. Marketing Science. 17(3), 181–195. Collett, S. (1999). Channel Conflicts Push Levi To Halt Web Sales. Computerworld. 33(45), 8. Cattani, K. D., W. G. Gilland & J. M. Swaminathan. (2004a). Adding a direct channel? How autonomy of the direct channel affects prices and profits. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Cattani, K. D., W. G. Gilland., H. S. Heese and J. M. Swaminathan. (2005). Boiling Frogs: Pricing Strategies for a Manufacturer Adding a Direct Channel that Competes with the Traditional Channel. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Chan, P. S., & Pollard. D., (2003). Succeeding in the Dotcom Economy: Challenges for Brick and Mortar Companies. International Journal of Management, 20(1), 11-16. Chiang, W. K., Chhajed, D. & Hess, J. D. (2003). Direct marketing, indirect profits: A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design. Management Science. 49 (1) 1-20. Kumar, N., & Ruan, R. (2006). On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 4(3), 289-323. Lal, R. and Sarvary M. (1999). When and How is the Internet Likely to Decrease Price Competition? Marketing Science, 18, 485-503. Paterson, R. A., Balasubramanian, S., Bronnenberg, B. J. (1997). Exploring the Implications of the Internet for Consumer Marketing, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 25(4), 329-346。 Rhee, B., & Park, S. Y. (2000). Online stores as a new direct channel and emerging hybrid channel system. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Hong Kong. Tsay, A., & N. Agrawal. (2001). Channel conflict and coordination: An investigation of supply chain design. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of SantaClara. Webb, K. L., and Hogan, John E.(2002). Managing channels of distribution in the age of electronic commerce. Industrial Marketing Management, 31, 95-102. Webb, K. L., & Hogan, J. E.(2002) Hybrid Channel Conflict; cause and effect on channel performance, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 17(5), 338-356. Yoo, S. W., & Lee, E. (2005). The Impact of the Internet Channel Introduction on Distribution Channel Management. Singapore :University of Singapore, Wharton-SMU Research Center.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how a internet channel affects every channel member by game theory while it accedes to forthcoming vertical channel system. When does a manufacture or a retailer introduce the internet channel. We focus on channel members' position and bargaining power.
On the basic model, We consider a manufacture and an independent physical retailer. Channel decisions and price decisions of firms are our decision parameters. We continue use Chiang's (2003) model, and add a parameter of customer acceptance of a internet channel in our model. We find that when a manufacture has higher bargaining power relative to a retailer, it will use the price discrimination strategy in order to exert synergy of virtual and physical channels. A retailer introduces the internet channel uncertainly. In contrast, when a retailer has higher bargaining power relative to a manufacture, a manufacture can't use the price discrimination strategy nicely. At this moment, a manufacture can't introduce the internet channel. However, even if a retailer introduces the internet channel, no selling volume in this internet channel. So internet channel is just a accessory role for a retailer.
On the extended model, we add another two factors. At first, we add a new internet group that prefer internet channel, and there are three groups in this model. Second, we consider that a manufacture introduce the internet channel, and it is afraid that a retailer rises up to fight against it's price decisions. So a manufacture's internet price is the same as retail price. We find that when a manufacture has higher bargaining power relative to a retailer and a little of internet customers that prefer the internet channel, only a manufacture introduces the internet channel. In contrast, a great deal of internet customers that prefer internet channel, a manufacture and a retailer introduce the internet channel. When a manufacture has smaller bargaining power relative to a retailer, both a manufacture and a retailer introduce the internet channel.
In conclusion, bargaining power and customer acceptance of the internet channel can affect the channel decision and price decision of firms. So we suggest that before firms introduce the internet channel, they must evaluate their bargaining power and distribution of customers.

在基本模型方面,模型包含單一製造商與單一獨立實體零售商,廠商的通路決策與訂價決策為本研究的決策參數,並且沿用Chiang (2003) 的模型,以及模型中網路通路之顧客接受度的重要參數。研究結果顯示,當製造商擁有較高議價力時,會使用差別取價策略以發揮虛、實通路組合的綜效,但零售商則不一定會引進網路通路;反之,當零售商擁有較高議價力時,製造商引進網路通路不再具有優勢,零售商則可能引進網路通路,但將網路通路視為輔助性的角色。
其他識別: U0005-1907200717312700
Appears in Collections:企業管理學系所

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