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|標題:||Do conflicts of interest really exist when lending banks are also stockholders?
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The main purpose of this study is to discuss whether or not there exist the conflicts of interest when the lending banks are also stockholders, and how the loan terms or the payout yields react to such conflicts of interest. We intend to figure out the way of the lending banks in reducing the conflicts of interest and find out the certain type of lending banks which the conflicts of interest drive from by the observation of the changes of loan terms and payout yield. We include the companies included in S&P500 between 1996 and 2006 as the sample of this study. We differentiate between the boards with banks and those without banks, and whether the lending bankers on board or not. We would like to find the effect of each type of banker on loan terms. The results show that, the companies with the banker on board could obtain relatively better loan terms, and the companies who have the lending banker on board could get the lower loan spread rate.
We further aim at the lending banker on board by comparing their equity stakes and debt claims to probe the probability of the existence of the conflicts of interest and its effect on the loan terms. The results reveal that the probabilities of the collateral increases, the loan size decreases and the payout yield increases when the equity stakes are larger than debt claims (E>D). On the other hand, the spread rate decreases when the equity stakes are less than debt claims (E
In addition, we differentiate between two types of bankers on boards according to the initial time of the lending relationship between the company and the bank. One type is (i) that the bank enters the board first, and lend to the company afterwards (Board_before_lend); the other type is (ii) that the bank makes a loan to the company first, and enters the board afterwards (Lend_before_board). These two different types of bankers might help find out the effect of the timing on loan terms. Compared to the case (ii), case (i) would be associated with the increase in the spread rate and the probabilities of the presence of the collateral. As a result, the banks of the case (i) would possibly encounter more conflicts of interest.
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