Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20943
標題: 資訊揭露與授信條件關聯性之研究
The Relationship between Information Disclosure and Loan Terms
作者: 顏志安
Yen, Chih-An
關鍵字: information disclosure;資訊揭露;loan spread;agency problems;cost of debt capital;利率加碼;代理問題;負債資金成本
出版社: 企業管理學系所
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摘要: 
Since a series of recent corporate scandals involving renowned firms show linkage with insufficient disclosure of information, banks and investors now seriously doubt the reliability of corporate information, and corporate governance has become a focus for the global capital market. Among governments' efforts to formulate more strict regulations, requirements have been made for corporations to improve information disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry between inside and outside the firm. In 2003, the Securities and Futures Institute (SFI) in Taiwan launched “Information Disclosure and Transparence Ranking System” (IDTRS), expecting that this system can improve the companies' information transparency. According to the past research, improving information disclosures is one of the best solutions to reduce risk. Therefore this study will discuss whether or not the information disclosure affects loan terms. In this study, information transparency is measured as the disclosure level and the change of ranking and transparency of voluntary information disclosure in 3rd, 4th and 5th appraisal.
Primary results indicate that information disclosure definitely influences loan terms. Enhancing the information disclosures helps enterprises obtain a lower interest spread. Further the negative relationship between the level of disclosures and the loan spread is stronger (weaker) for firms that are characterized by high (low) market uncertainty. From the perspective of transparency of voluntary disclosure, the loan size of the more transparent firms is greater than that of the less transparent firms.

知名企業近年來頻頻爆發醜聞弊案,多少與資訊揭露不充分有關。放款銀行與股市投資人開始強烈質疑公開資訊的正確性及可靠性,公司治理問題也成為資本市場關注的焦點,而企業資訊透明化是提升公司治理之重要源頭,因此各國政府與相關之機構陸續研擬更嚴格的法規,要求公司強化資訊揭露程度以降低內外部資訊不對稱情形。證基會在考量我國國情及與國際接軌之原則下於2003年建置「資訊揭露評鑑系統」,藉由此套系統證基會希望可以促使企業提昇其資訊揭露的透明度。過去許多學者的研究發現提升資訊透明度是有效降低風險的方法之一,而風險較低的企業在向金融機構融資時也可以取得較佳的授信條件。本研究將探討是否能夠透過提升資訊揭露程度,幫助企業取得較佳的授信條件,並透過「資訊揭露評鑑系統」第三屆至第五屆之評鑑等級來衡量企業之資訊透明度。文獻中有關資訊透明度之研究多以單期為主,有鑒於過去研究發現債券評等之變動可產生新的資訊內涵,因此,本篇研究加入評鑑結果跨期比較之變動值及企業自願性揭露資訊之程度,希望可以更全面的衡量企業之資訊透明度。
主要研究結果指出,企業資訊揭露評鑑等級的提升確實會影響債權人對企業發生危機的認知,進而反映在授信條件上,其中最有助於企業取得較低的利率加碼。另外,處於高風險的企業向銀行進行貸款時,若管理者能提升資訊揭露評鑑等級,則其利率加碼降低的幅度會比已經是低風險的企業提升評鑑等級來的明顯。而在提升自願性揭露之評鑑指標方面,將企業本身的評鑑結果列為自願性揭露資訊較透明者,最有助於企業取得較高的借款額度。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20943
其他識別: U0005-0807201015364300
Appears in Collections:企業管理學系所

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