Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/23212
標題: 金融海嘯、公司治理與公司績效
Financial Tsunami, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance
作者: Hung, Yu-Chiao
洪煜喬
關鍵字: finance tsunami;金融海嘯;corporate governance;agency problem;公司治理;代理人問題
出版社: 財務金融系所
引用: 中文文獻部分: 牛廷苓,2000,「股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效關係之研究-以高科技產業與傳統產業為例」,國立中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 古佳禾,2004,銀行往來關係、監督機制與道德危險之實証研究,中原大學,碩士論文。 李愛珠,2003,「多空頭市場下公司治理與公司經營績效關聯性差異之研究」,東吳大學會計學研究所未出版之碩士論文。 林景亮,2000,「台灣紡織業上市公司在亞洲金融風暴期間財務經營績效比較之研究」,國立高雄第一科技大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 洪世炳,2004,「公司治理、股權結構與公司績效關係之實證研究」,國立彰化師範大學商業教育學研究所未出版碩士論文。 高蘭芬,2002,董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響,國立成功大學會計研究所未出版博士論文。 連紘毅,2006,「公司治理與財務決策-以台灣電子業為例」,逢甲大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文。 陳美惠,2002,「會計師簽證、法人持股與資訊不對稱對空頭市場股票報酬影響之研究」,朝陽科技大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 西文文獻部分: Altunbas, Y., Fazylov, O. & Molyneux, P., 2009. Evidence on the bank-lending channel in Europe. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(11), pp.2093-2110. Berle, A.A. & Means, G.C., 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan. Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C. & Smith Jr, C.W., 1988. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.267-291. Chaganti, R.S., Mahajan, V. & Sharma, S., 1985. Corporate board size, composition and corporate failures in retailing industry. Journal of Management Studies, 22(4), p.400–417. Ching, K.M.L., Firth, M. & Rui, O.M., 2006. Earnings Management , Corporate Governance and the Market Performance of Seasoned Equity Offerings. Journal of Contemporary Accounting Economics, 2(1), pp.73-98. Claessens, S. et al., 2002. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57(6), pp.2741-2771. Demsetz, H., 1983. The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp.375-390. Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure M. C. Jensen, ed. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp.305-360. Jensen, M.C. & Ruback, R.S., 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), pp.5-50. Koh, P.-S., 2003. On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive corporate earnings management in Australia. The British Accounting Review, 35(2), pp.105-128. La Porta, R. et al., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), pp.1113-1155. La Porta, R. et al., 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance, 57(3), pp.1147-1170. Lemmon, M.L. & Lins, K.V., 2003. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Finance, 58(4), pp.1445-1468. Mitton, T., 2002. A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2), pp.215-241. Morck, R., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), pp.293-315. Piotroski, J.D., 2000. Value Investing: The Use of Historical Financial Statement Information to Separate Winners from Losers. Journal of Accounting Research, 38(April), p.1. Pound, J., 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1/2), pp.237-265. Qian, J.L.K.L.G. & Fang, Y., 2006. The effects of institutional ownership on corporate governance and performance: an empirical assessment in Hong Kong. Management International Review, 46(3), pp.259-276. Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 1998. Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 11,pp.40– 48. Salmon, W.J., 1993. Crisis prevention: how to gear up your board. Harvard Business Review, 71(1), pp.68-75. Singh, M. & Davidsoniii, W., 2003. Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), pp.793-816. Zahra, S.A. & Pearce, J.A., 1989. Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15(2), pp.291-334. Zou, H., Adams, M.B. & Buckle, M.J., 2003. Corporate Risks and Property Insurance: Evidence From the Peopleʼs Republic of China. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 70(2), p.289–314.
摘要: 
本研究以金融海嘯為背景,探討台灣上市櫃公司在這段期間之公司治理情況,以及公司治理對於公司價值的影響,並將範圍擴展至風暴發生後一年,探討風暴之後的公司治理與公司價值的情況,最後,比較在金融風暴期間是否比非金融風暴時期,公司治理會更加的顯著影響公司價值與公司績效。
實證結果發現:
(i)在股價報酬率方面,內部人持股率、董事會規模以及機構投資人持股在風暴期間對股價報酬率皆有顯著的影響。而在風暴後一年的實證結果則沒有特別顯著的關係,若比較風暴中與非風暴時期,風暴期間的公司治理變數呈現更加的顯著影響公司的股價報酬率。
(ii)在Tobin’s Q方面,內部人持股率、董事會規模以及機構投資人持股在風暴期間對Tobin’s Q也有顯著關係,並且風暴後一年的實證結果則沒有那麼的顯著,但若比較風暴中與非風暴時期之公司治理變數對Tobin’s Q的影響,則實證結果顯示,金融風暴時期,各種公司治理變數並無特別的比非風暴時期顯著。

This study uses the financial tsunami as the background to explore the performances of the companies which are going on the market, cabinet in Taiwan , and what effects do the corporate governance of their own have on the value of the firm during this period. And we then extend the time period into one year later after the financial tsunami to do research on the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. Finally, we compare values and performances of the firms to see if the factor of corporate governance affects them more in the period of financial tsunami than in the period of non-financial tsunami .This question is what we want to ask.
Empirical results:
(i) As for the stock return, the ratio of insider ownership, board size and institutional investors holding shares have significant impacts on the stock return during financial tsunami; however, one year after the financial tsunami, it doesn't have significant relationship for stock return. If we compare the two periods, financial tsunami and non-crisis, the factor of corporate governance during financial tsunami shows a more significant impact on the company''s stock return than in non-crisis period.
(ii)how about the Tobin''s Q? The ratio of insider ownership, board size and institutional investors holding shares also have significant impacts on the company's Tobin''s Q during financial tsunami. However, one year after the financial tsunami, it doesn't have particularly significant relationship for Tobin''s Q either. If we compare impacts of the factor of corporate governance on Tobin''s Q in financial tsunami times with non-crisis period, the variables of corporate governance do not show more significant relationship for Tobin''s Q during financial tsunami than during non-crisis times.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/23212
其他識別: U0005-1207201115050200
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所

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