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|標題:||Why Do Companies Go Private and Use LBOs ?
|關鍵字:||going-private;下市;pure going-private;LBO;Sarbanes-Oxley Act;logistic model;multinomial logistic model;單純下市;融資買下;沙賓法案;邏輯斯模型;多項邏輯模型||出版社:||財務金融系所||引用:||Abarbanell, Jeffery S. and Brian J. Bushee, 1998, Abnormal returns to a fundamental analysis strategy, Accounting Review 73, 19-45. Aharony, Joseph, Charles D. Jones, and Itzhak Swary, 1980, An analysis of risk and return characteristics of corporate bankruptcy using capital market data, Journal of Finance 35, 1001-1016. Ambrose, W. Brent and Drew B. Winters,1992, Does an industry effect exists for leveraged buyouts? Financial management 21,89-101. Anderson, Christopher W. and Luis Garcia-Feijoo, 2006, Empirical evidence on capital investment, growth options, and security returns, Journal of Finance 61, 171-194. Cao, Jerry and Josh Lerner, 2006, The performance of reverse leveraged buyouts, Working paper, Harvard University. Chauvin, Keith W. and Mark Hirschey, 1993, Advertising, R&D expenditures and the market value of the firm, Financial Management 22 (4), 128-140. Dartar, Vinay, Narayan Naik, and Robert Radcliffe, 1998, Liquidity and asset returns: An alternative test, Journal of Financial Markets 1, 203-220. DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo, and E. Rice, 1984, Going private: Minority freezeouts and stockholder wealth, Journal of Law and Economics 27, 367-402. Degeorge, Francois and Richard Zeckhauser, 1993, The reverse LBO decision and firm performance, Theory and evidence, Journal of Finance 48, 1323-1348. Goyal, Amit and Pedro Santa-Clara, 2003, Idiosyncratic risk matters!, Journal of Finance 58,975-1007. Halpern, Paul, Robert Kieschnick, and Wendy Rotenberg, 1999, On the heterogeneity of leveraged going private transactions, Review of Financial Studies 12, 281-309. Jensen, C. Michael, 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323-329. Jensen, C. Michael, 1989, Eclipse of the public corporation, Harvard Business Review 77, 61-75. Jung, Kooyul, Yong-Cheol Kim and Rene M. Stulz, 1996, Timing, investment opportunities, manegerial discretion, and the security issue decision, Journal of Finance 42, 159-185. Kaplan, Steven N., 1988, Management buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a source of value, Journal of Finance 44,611-632. Kieschnick, Robert, 1998, Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private transactions revisited, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 25, 187-202. Lakonishok, Josef, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1994, Contrarian investment, extrapolation, and risk, Journal of Finance 49, 1541-1578. Lee, Charles M.C. and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, 2000, Price momentum and trading volume, Journal of Finance 55, 2017-2069. Lehn, Kenneth and Annette Poulsen, 1989, Free cash flow and stock holder gains in going private transactions, Journal of Finance 44, 771-787. Long, William and David Ravenscraft, 1993, The financial performance of whole company LBOs, Working paper, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau Maksimovic, Vojislav. and Pegaret Pichler, 2001, Technological innovation and IPOs, Review of Financial Studies 14, 459-494. Miller, H. Merton, 1991, Leverage, Journal of Finance 46,479-488. Opler, Time and Sheridan Titman, 1993, Determinants of leverage buyout activity: Free cash flow vs. financial distress costs, Journal of Finance 47, 1985-1999. Servaes, Henri, 1994, Do takeover overinvest?, Review of Financial Studies 7, 253-278. Shumway, Tyler, 2001, Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model, Journal of Business 74, 101-124. Smith, Abbie, 1990, Corporate ownership structure and performance: The case of management buyouts, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 143-164. Weir, Chaelie, David Laing and Mike Wright,2005, Undervaluation, private information, agency costs and the decision to go private, Applies Financial Economics15,947-961.||摘要:||
This study investigates the driving forces behind going private and their impacts on the tendency to take LBOs. Companies with high Tobin's Q and low cash flow tend to remain in the public markets, which only weakly supports the free-cash-flow hypothesis. Furthermore, we find that firms with lower market-adjusted returns but high growth rate of sales are more likely to go private. It reveals that undervaluation is an important determinant in going private decision. In addition, we find that firms with lower financial slack, higher idiosyncratic risk, lower CER but high growth rate of sales tend to go private. These results, respectively, imply that information asymmetry and company-specific risk also motive firms to go private. In addition, by separating all samples into two groups, pre- and post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that firms with higher tax liability are more likely to go private after the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Furthermore, given the decision to go private, companies with low agency cost, less strong background, less tax liability and higher idiosyncratic risk are reluctant to engage in LBOs. It is also found that RLBO with low Tobin's Q, high cash flow and low accounting profitability tend to perform better after returning to public market again, which confirm that LBO is a mechanism to resolve undervaluation and agency problem.
|Appears in Collections:||財務金融學系所|
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