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標題: 併購案件中最適資本結構與代理問題之分析
The Analysis of Optimal Capital Structure and Agency problems in Mergers and Acquisitions
作者: 廖怡琳
Liao, Yi-Lin
關鍵字: Optimal Capital Structure;最適資本結構;Agency Problems;Mergers and Acquisitions;代理問題;購併
出版社: 財務金融系所
引用: 中文參考資料 王元章(2007),歷史資訊對資本結構之影響性,國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文 洪永昌(2004),企業生命週期與融資策略,國立台灣科支大學財金務金融所碩士班 辜儀芳(2001),台灣上市公司資本結構選擇之實證研究,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文 蔡宗孝(2006),企業資本結構及融資決策選擇之探討,國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文 英文參考資料 Ang, J. S., R. A. Cole and J. W. Lin(2000), “Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, The Journal of Finance, pp.81-106. Asquith, P., R. Bruner and D. Mullins(1983), “The gains to bidding firms from merger”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.121-140. Ayla Kayhan, Sheridan Timan(2007), “Firms’ histories and their capital structures”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.1-32. Blose L. E. and J. C. P. Shieh(1997), “Tobin’s q Ratio and Market Reaction to Capital Investment Announcements”, The Financial Review, pp.449-476. Baker, Malcolm and Jeffrey Wurgler(2002), “Market Timing and Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance, pp.1-32. Chan, S. H., Martin, J. D., J. W. kensinger(1990), “Corporate Research and Development Expenditure and Share Value”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.255-276. Chung, K. H., Wright, P., C. , Charoenwong (1998), “Investment opportunities and market reaction to capital expenditure decisions”, Journal of banking and Finance, pp.41-60. Fama, E.F., and K.R., French(2002), “Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and debt”, Review of Financial Studies, pp.1-34. Fairfield, P.M., Whisenant, J.S., and T.L.,Yohn (2003), “Accrued earnings and growth: Implications for future profitability and market mispricing”, Accounting Review, pp.353-371. Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard R. G., B. C. Peterson.(1988), “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment”, Brookings Papers on Economic, pp.141-205. Fluck, Z.(1999), “The dynamics of management-shareholder conflict”, Review of Financial Studies, pp.347-377. Flannery, Mark J., and K. P. Rangan(2006), “Partial adjustment and target capital structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.469-506. Harford, J.(1999), “Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions”, Journal of Financial, pp.1969-1997. Harford, J. ,Klasa, S. and N. Walcott (2007), “Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from acquisitions”, Working Paper Series Harris, M., and A., Raviv(1991), “The Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Financial, pp.297-355 Hart, O. and J., Moore(1995), “Debt and seniority: and analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management”, American Economic Review, pp.567-585 Hovakimian, A., Opler T., and S. Titman(2001), “The debt-equity choice”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp.1-24. Hovakimian A.(2004), “The Role of Target Leverage in Security Issues and Repurchases”, Journal of Business, pp.1041-1072. Jalilvand, A., and R.S. Harris(1984), “Corporate behavior in adjusting to capital structure and dividend targets: An econometric study”, Journal of Finance, pp.127-145. Jensen, M.(1986), “Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers”, American Economic Review, pp.323-329. Leary, Mark, and M. R. Roberts(2005), “Do firms rebalance their capital structure”, Journal of Finance, pp.2575-2619. Lang, L.H.P., and R.H. Litzenberger(1989), “Dividend Announcement: Cash Flow Signaling versus Free cash Flow Hypothesis?”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.181-192. Lang L., Stulz R., Walking R.(1989), “Managerial performance, Tobin’s q, and the gains from successful tender offers”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.137-154. Loughran, T. and A. M. Vijh(1997), “Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from corporate Acquisitions?” Journal of Finance, pp.1765-1790. McConnel, J.J. and C. J. Muscarella(1985), “Corporate Capital Expenditure and the Market Value of the Firm”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.399-422. Morck, R., Shleifer A. and R. W. Vishny(1990), “Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?”, The Journal of Finance, pp.31-48. Myers, C.(1977), “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”, Journal of Financial Economics”, pp.147-176. Opler, T., Pinkowitz L., Stulz R., and R. Williamson.(1999), “The Dterminants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.3-46. Richardson, S.(2006), “Over-investment of Free Cash Flow”, Review of Accounting Studies, pp.159-189. Singh, M., and N. Davidson(2003), “Agency Costs, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Mechanisms”, Journal of Banking and Finance, pp.793-816 Stulz, R.(1990), “Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.3-27. Sudarsanam, S., Holl P. and A. Salami(1996), “Shareholder wealth gains in mergers: effects of synergy and ownership structure”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting , pp.673-698. Shleifer, A. and J, Lie(2003), “Stock Market Driven Acquisitions”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.295-311. Titman, S., K. Wei, and F. Xie(2004), “Capital Investments and Stock Returens”, Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp.677-700.
We measured agency problems and optimal, or, target capital structure by using the approach in Richardson(2006) and Harford, Klasa, and Walcott(2007), respectively. We take into account free cash flow and over-investment as two measures of agency problems. Based on these two measures, we examine the relation among acquisitions, capital structure, and agency problems for American listed companies from 1987 to 2007. In the corporate events of mergers and acquisitions, acquiring firms are more likely to be the firms with more free cash flow and over-investment before mergers and acquisitions in additions acquiring firms are also looking for the target firms with more free cash flow but less over-investment. Both agency problems have significantly negative impact on the acquirer's stock performance after mergers and acquisitions. The acquirer's capital structure moves toward its target level, when the over-investment problems alleviate. This result is consistent with the theory of optimal capital structure.

本研究採用Richardson(2006)與Harford, Klasa, and Walcott(2007)兩篇文獻之模型,分別衡量代理問題與資本結構變數,其中代理問題變數分為自由現金流量與非預期性投資支出,探討購併活動對代理問題與資本結構之間關係之影響。以1987年至2007年期間在美國上市公司,其中宣告購併事件公司作為主要研究樣本。研究顯示購併宣告前主併公司若擁有許多自由現金流量,管理者不願意將自由現金流量發還給股東,因此利用購併活動消耗之,另一方面所預留下次投資支出存量越高,管理者有足夠投資籌碼可實行大規模購併機會,因此主併公司所採行購併活動動機也就越高。從目標公司角度解釋,主併公司尋找目標公司的代理問題也相同條件,亦即許多自由現金流量與所預留下次投資支出存量越高,表示主併公司看中目標公司的許多投資空間,才會對其有興趣;反之,若目標公司的管理者購併前已過度從事消費額外津貼或是從事次佳風險的活動,並未給予主併公司綜效,成為購併對象機率相對較低。主併公司購併後代理問題比購併前代理問題減緩,股價報酬表現將相對較佳。研究顯示代理問題變數與目標槓桿偏差值為正向顯著性,係指當代理問題隨之減少,公司負債比率也會走向目標資本結構,符合最適資本結構理論。
其他識別: U0005-2106200922045200
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所

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