中國上市公司政治關係與股權結構對公司績效之影響

Abstract

本研究探討中國政治關係對公司經營績效的影響以及代理人不同之利益目標函數，是否會影響公司之經營績效，本文以2008-2010上海證券交易所之上市公司做為分析的樣本。本研究之經營績效指標採取Chung and Pruitt(1994)提出之近似的Tobin’s Q的計算方式，結果發現政府官員曾經擔任行政職務對績效的影響為負向顯著，其方向與大部分文獻符合。在股權結構方面，代理理論一直為一個經典的議題，本研究指出國有股持股比率與公司經營績效呈顯著負相關，由於其利益目標與所投資公司之績效無關，故國有股在投資對象的選擇與監督上，並不以績效為主要考量，使得國有股較大比例的公司，反而對企業績效有負面影響，使其績效受損；而法人機構持股對公司經營績效則是負向顯著的影響；至於公司內部人持股對公司績效並沒有特別的影響。而公司管理型態指標為董事長是否兼任總經理，結果指出其對公司經營績效沒有特別的影響。

This research is about the effects to companies’ management achievement which are caused by the relative of Chinese politics. In addition, it contains if the difference of the agent’s target function of advantage will influence companies’ management achievement. The article uses the data from 2008 to 2010 of public traded company of Shanghai Stock Exchange to be the analytic sample. In this research, the index of management achievement is Tobin’s Q which was Chung and Pruitt brought up in 1994. Then, the result reveals that it causes negative effects to the management achievement if a government official was once an administrator and the negative slope conforms to most of records. In this aspect of ownership structure, Agency Theory is always a theme for discussion. Moreover, this research indicates the percentage of state institutional shares and companies’ management achievement is negative. Because the advantage target is unconcerned with the achievement of company which is invested, achievement is not the main reason when state institutional shares chooses or supervises the investment object. Therefore, the company, whose percentage of state institutional shares is more, has negative influences to management achievement and damages it. Furthermore, if it owns private institutional shares, it also causes negative effects to companies’ management achievement. On the contrary, insider ownership doesn’t have any influence to companies’ management achievement. Besides, if a chairman is also a general manager, it will not influence companies’ management achievement.