Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/24943
標題: 企業家族化對租稅規避活動之影響
The Effects of Family Control on Corporate Tax Avoidance
作者: 黃秀謙
Hunag, Hsiu-Chien
關鍵字: 家族企業;Family firms;租稅規避;有效稅率;現金有效稅率;Tax aggressive;Effective tax rates;Cash effective tax rate
出版社: 高階經理人碩士在職專班
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摘要: 
家族企業在全球商業中一直扮演著相當重要的角色,不論是歐美、亞洲各國或台灣的企業組織,家族企業都是普遍存在的企業組織型態。家族企業為當今台灣重要的組織型態,租稅成本又是企業重要的成本支出。租稅規避雖然對企業有節省成本的利益,但避稅的隱避性和複雜性可能會增加了企業潛在的成本及風險,包括來自管理者隱蔽行為所產生的非稅成本與被國稅局列為選案查核的對象。在我國獨特的租稅系統與公司治理環境下,家族企業相較於非家族企業是否會從事較多的租稅規避。
本研究以2005年至2008年台灣上市公司為研究對象,考量企業家族化與租稅規避間的關係。並以有效稅率(ETR)、現金有效稅率(CETR)二項做為租稅規避恆量之代理變數,且控制了獲利能力、財務槓桿、虧損扣抵、所得稅抵減、資本密集度、無形資產、投資收益、公司規模來檢測家族企業與非家族企業與租稅規避活動之關聯性。研究結果為家族企業和現金有效稅率呈顯著的正向關係,實證結果顯示,家族企業相較於非家族企業較不易進行租稅規避的活動,其結論與Chen et al.(2010)的結果一致。我國家族企業會基於非稅成本的考量,避免被國稅局調帳查核的風險以及維護家族與企業的聲譽,較非家族企業不易進行租稅規避的活動。

Family firms is one of the most important firm organizations in Taiwan, and tax costs are significant costs for firms. The most benefit of tax aggressiveness is tax savings for firms, but relatively, tax aggressiveness may increase the potential risks and costs according to its avoidance and complexity, including stock discount, potential audit penalty imposed by the regulators, reputation damaged and other non-tax costs This study investigates whether family firms are more or less tax aggressiveness than non-family firms.
Using a sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2008, this study uses two measures, effective tax rate (ETR) and cash effective tax rate (CETR), as tax aggressiveness proxies, to examine the relation between family firms and tax aggressiveness.This study finds that family firms are significantly positive with cash effective tax rates. The empirical result shows that family firms are less tax aggressiveness than non-family firms, consistent with the results of Chen et al. (2010). Family firms are more concerned with the reputation damage and penalaty form the regulators,therefore gamily firms ate less tax aggussiveness than non-fimly firms.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/24943
其他識別: U0005-2308201315573200
Appears in Collections:高階經理人碩士在職專班

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