Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/25173
標題: 盈餘認列時效性不對稱與董事會特性之關係
The Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings and Board of Director Characteristics
作者: 莊素麗
Chuang, Su-Li
關鍵字: 董事會獨立性;board independence;會計穩健;盈餘認列時效性不對稱;accounting conservatism;asymmetric timeliness of earnings
出版社: 高階經理人碩士在職專班
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摘要: 
我國企業家族色彩濃厚,大小股東之間存在著資訊不對稱,故公司治理之重點在於如何防止控制股東為謀求個人利益而侵害一般小股東之權益。為強化董事會有效率執行業務,提昇公司經營績效,增加公司及股東之價值,主管機關遂引進獨立董事制度。盈餘認列不對稱時效性的穩健會計政策,可提供董事會及時的訊號,以監控、調查投資計
畫及經理人,避免經理人從事不利投資所產生的無謂損失,因此穩健會計有助於董事會執行監控的職責。
為探討董事會特性是否影響公司盈餘報導的穩健程度,本研究以2007年至2009年臺灣上市公司為樣本,採用Basu (1997) 模型,檢視盈餘時效性不對稱與董事會獨立性、職務雙重性及董事會規模等之關係。實證結果顯示,我國上市公司多已採用保守穩健的會計政策,亦即盈餘能及時反應壞消息,損失之認列具有時效性。因此,董事會特性與
盈餘認列時效性並無顯著關係,本研究發現董事會獨立性與盈餘增額反應壞消息無顯著正向關係,且董事長兼任總經理、董事會規模等,亦無顯著影響盈餘反應壞消息的增額時效性。代表當公司已採用保守穩健之會計政策時,增加董事會獨立性並不會再增額地增進損失的認列,即不會增額地增加條件式穩健,以避免盈餘過度穩健、損失過度認列,致使盈餘品質扭曲。

In Taiwan, most firms are family-owned business. Under such setting of information asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders, controlling shareholders have incentives and the ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, the aim of corporate governance is to mitigate agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in Taiwanese firms. In order to strengthen the board’s accountability, the Authority has introduced the concept of the independent director. By recognizing economic losses in a timelier manner, conservative accounting information provides early warning signals to boards to investigate both loss projects and the managers. This limits deadweight losses from poor investment decisions and thus increases firm and equity values. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between board characteristics and asymmetric timeliness of earnings.

Using a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan stock exchange between 2007 and 2009, this study examines the relation between three board of director characteristics that focus on the independence and monitoring incentives of boards and conditional accounting conservatism. This study employs Basu’s (1997) earnings-return model to measure the asymmetric timeliness. After controlling for institutional ownership, firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, cash flows from operations, audit quality and unobservable firm characteristics that are stable over time, the empirical results finds no significantly positive effect of board independence on asymmetric timeliness coefficient as well as board size and CEO/chair duality are unrelated to conditional accounting conservatism. Since most companies have adopted conservative accounting policies which report earnings more sensitively to bad news than to good news, the evidence shows no positive relation between board independence and conditional conservatism. This could avoid distorting reported earnings by recognizing excess losses and over-conservatism.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/25173
其他識別: U0005-1108201215303900
Appears in Collections:高階經理人碩士在職專班

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