Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/27998
標題: 我國稻米進口權利金標售制度之實證研究
A Study on Rice Quota Auction in Taiwan
作者: 張淑惠
Chang, Shu-Hui
關鍵字: common-value auction;共同價值標售模型;rice quota auction;稻米關稅配額;贏家詛咒
出版社: 應用經濟學系所
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摘要: 
本文以我國進口稻米標售制度為主,考量影響得標糧商對標售標的物真實評價水準之變數,進而探討相關重要變數對糧商投標的真實評價及投標行為所產生的影響,以推估政府的預期拍賣收益水準。此外對於施行「複數價格標」是否會存在贏家詛咒現象假說,亦詳加探討,最後引導出可增進收益之相關拍賣政策,以供有司參考。
本研究參考主要拍賣理論之原則與相關研究之重要經濟變數,如可能影響競價者投標意願之因素、標的物價格不確定性、標的物在國內次級市場流通價格等因素,對以事後的出價變異程度衡量競價者之出價行為,以及平均得標價格以代表對政府收益指標的影響,循出價變異數與平均得標價格為應變數所建立之二個線性迴歸模型進行分析。分析期間則為2003至2006年國內稻米進口拍賣相關資料。
本研究之統計結果顯示,「得標筆數」與「得標價格變異」二者之間,以及「國內稻米價格的變動率」與「得標價格變異」之間均是呈正向關係,而「標售稻米進口總數量」與「得標價格變異」之間則呈負向之關係。在共同價值模型之下,我國進口稻米標售制度受贏家詛咒的影響假說並不顯著為統計結果所支持,顯示政府可以透過控制相關重要變數的作法,以達到影響糧商對於進口稻米的評價行為。本研究亦指出,政府可透過拍賣制度的調整,採取如:增加得標的糧商家數或訂定投標的底價等策略,有效的增加拍賣預期收入。

This study is focused on the quota auction system in Taiwan rice market. The winning bidders' real pricing evaluation on imported rice quota is analyzed to measure the expected returns of public administrator from bidders' actual pricing decisions and bidding behavior. Besides, the Winner's Curse hypothesis is tested in this multiple-bids-multiple-unit model. Also, some improved strategies with better profitability under the current bidding system are proposed to the government in this study.
Observations from bidding market for imported rice data during 2003 to 2006 are selected for the study. Related variables include number of winning bidders, value uncertainty of objects and the rice price in domestic markets. The Linear Regression Model was adopted in this study.
Empirical results indicate as follows.
1. Positive correlation exists both between the number of winning bids and the variance of winning bids, and the variance of domestic rice prices and variance of winning bidders' prices. But the reverse relation can be found between the total quantity of bidding imported rice and variation of winning bidders' prices.
2. With the Common Value Model specification, this study finds that the current rice auction system has no solid prove in Winner's curse.
3. Statistical findings also support that the auction system can be improved to increase the expected profit with different strategies, which include the expansion in the number of competing bidders or announcement of base price.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/27998
其他識別: U0005-2607200721302800
Appears in Collections:應用經濟學系

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