Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/53835
標題: 股票分割的信號,誰發出的信號?
The Signal of Stock Splits- Who Send the Signal?
作者: 楊東曉
關鍵字: 經濟學;應用研究
摘要: 
文獻中至少有三個解釋股票分割的動機,最適交易價格區間及市場造市假說著重在市場對股票分割的短期反應;另外,信號假說指出股票分割乃是公司傳達其未來營運樂觀的信號,因此著重在股票分割與公司長期表現的關係上。然而,上述的三種假說卻無提及有關經理人誘因的解釋或影響,能力較佳的公司經理人,在較大的股票相關報酬的誘因下,也希望透過各種不同的方式將其對公司努力的成果,傳達給市場上的投資人或是相關的資料使用者。本文利用美國完整的股票相關報酬資料,計算並分析股票相關報酬所產生的誘因效果,對股票分割所產生的影響。利用不同程度的誘因效果將本文的樣本加以分割,並觀察高誘因效果與低誘因效果的公司,在股票分割的決策上是否有明顯的差異,此外,本文亦將誘因效果與公司長短期的經營表現加以連結,並與無股票分割的公司加以比較,如此可提供另一個角度來分析股票分割的動機。本文嘗試提出相關的實證結果,來回應文獻上三個尚未被回答的問題。第一、公司經理人在決策股票分割時,是否會受到股票報酬相關的誘因效果所影響?此問題的實證將提供一個連結經理人報酬與股票分割的依據;第二、股票分割的宣告效果能反映多少誘因相關的訊息?此實證乃是對效率市場在誘因效果的反映再驗證;第三、在解釋股票分割公司長期的超額報酬方面,經理人的誘因效果提供了多少額外的解釋能力?由於現有文獻已對此超額報酬提出相關的解釋變數,本文的誘因效果是否能再反映更多的訊息將是另一個探討的重點。

There are three major hypotheses in the explanation of abnormal performancefor firms splitting their stock. The trading range and market maker hypotheses focuson the short-term market reaction of stock splits and the signaling hypothesis focuson the transmission of future performance in a long term. However, there is noanalysis of managerial incentive in this issue. Hard-working managers who areincentivized by stock-based compensation have incentive to signal the market abouttheir effort. This may provide alternative explanation for the question about themotivation of splitting stock. In this paper, we utilize the stock-based compensationdata in ExecuComp and measure the incentive effect by the pay-for-performancesensitivity. Based on the distribution of the incentive effect, we can analyze how theincentive effect affects the decision of splitting stock. In addition, we also can linkthe incentive effect to the short-term and long-term abnormal performance bycomparing with matching firms without stock splits. Therefore, we try to providesome evidence for three unanswered questions. First, whether managers with higherincentive effect in their compensation would signal the market by stock splits? Theanswer for the question provides the linkage between executive compensation andsignaling hypothesis. Second, how much information about the incentive effect canbe reflected in stock price in the events of stock splits? In this test, we revisit theefficient market hypothesis from the angle of incentive effect. Finally, what is thelong-term performance of firms splitting their stock with respect to the impact ofincentive effect? Even though some existing evidence shows the positive answer forthis question, we would like to know whether the better performance is related tothe incentive effect.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/53835
其他識別: NSC99-2410-H005-032
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所

Show full item record
 

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.