Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/55393
標題: 現金流量預測、盈餘管理、高階經理人獎酬與外部就業機會
Cash Flow Forecasts, Earnings Management, Ceos' Compensation and Outside Employment Opportunities
作者: 林宜勉
關鍵字: 股票選擇權;Stock option;經濟學;現金流量預測;訴訟風險;外部融資成本;運氣給付;績效給付;外界就業機會;盈餘管理;基礎研究;Cash flow forecasts;Litigation risk;External financing cost;Payfor luck;Pay for performance;Outside employment opportunities,Earnings management
摘要: 
Yermack (1997) 及Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 均發現,由於股票選擇權的執行價格會與當日股票市價一致,所以高階經理人會在股票選擇權獎酬日前釋出壞消息,以使股價下跌,並在股票選擇權獎酬日後立即釋出好消息,以使其內涵價值增加。另外,最近有關公司自願性揭露的實務有所變革。Wasley and Wu (2006)指出,經理人現金流量預測的自願性揭露數目,自2000年代早期以來,迄今增加幅度超過三倍以上。當財務分析師預測公司將有盈餘虧損時,經理人較會自願揭露現金流量預測以調整分析師與投資人的預期。Kasznik and Lev (1995) 認為,經理人的盈餘預測很有可能傳遞壞消息,此意味著經理人關心訴訟風險,故先發制人的發佈盈餘預測來調整投資人期望的跌落。大體上,自願性揭露與強制性揭露的整體水準愈高,經理人愈不易利用操縱資訊揭露時點與從事盈餘管理,故不會由股票選擇權的執行價格與市價間的套利機會來獲得不當利潤;但當經理人持有較高比例的股票選擇權時,兩者的採用也可能使經理人更易操弄股價。Bartov and Mohanram (2004) 發現,高階經理人在履約大量股票選擇權前公司將有異常正盈餘,履約後則出現異常負盈餘,表示經理人知道未來盈餘不佳之私有資訊。如果經理人揭露資訊能有效增強公司的外部資金,則可預期自願性揭露與強制性揭露的整體水準愈高,經理人愈不易利用操縱資訊揭露時點與從事盈餘管理來獲得不當利潤。另Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003)指出,新經濟公司配股的主要目標係為留任新僱用員工,此因新創公司須要較多資金,故公司剛起步時較不願意將現金大量發放,而採用股票選擇權方式來獎勵有能力的員工。因此,本計畫在第一年的主要研究目的為:(1) 探討高階經理人現金流量預測公佈時點是否在股票選擇權授與日之後?經理人是否同時利用揭露現金流量預測及盈餘預測使其股票選擇權內涵價值提昇,進而獲取個人私利?(2) 探討揭露現金流量預測的公司是否為經營績效較佳或是有好消息的公司?公佈此項資訊的公司是否比未公佈的公司有更多有利的現金流量資訊? 新經濟公司或新創公司是否有藉由此項自願性揭露來發射好消息的訊號?(3) 探討公司揭露政策的整體水準是否影響公司的外部融資成本與成長性? 此水準是否為經理人用來操縱股價與盈餘管理的手段?另一方面,不論是學術界或實務界,如Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)、Bebchuk and Fried (2003) 與Rappaport (1999),均認為給付的大幅增加至少有一部分是屬於意外收穫,亦即經理人變得更加富有部分是牛市(指股價上漲時)所引起的。代理理論認為,經理人的薪酬若按相對於標竿的績效來給付,將可消除市場或部門績效對公司整體績效的影響。但一些文章卻認為此種指標難以觀察,因為經理人可按個人利益來設定給付,亦即可選擇按運氣給付或按績效給付。Oyer(2004)指出,標竿無法在獎酬中觀察,此因經理人的外界機會之價值是市場敏感的。這項理由可用來解釋為何當市場上漲時就沒有標竿,當市場情況不錯時,經理人外界機會也會提高,此時若公司為其訂定標竿,經理人將易離職。Himmelbergand Hubbard (2000) 及Oyer (2004) 皆認為:當經理人的保留薪資來自外界就業機會時,此制止經理人跳槽的保留薪資,將會隨著經濟繁榮而變動,這時沒有相對績效評估是較佳的。換句話說,雖然代理理論認為,公司應指標化經理人獎酬以消除市場寬度影響,亦即消除相對績效評估,但仍有文獻指出,當經濟繁榮時市場對具有才能的經理人之需求將提高,此時公司必然要順應市場潮流,支付給經理人更多獎酬以留住人才。因此,本計畫在第二年的主要研究目的為:(1) 驗證經理人的外界就業機會是否來自經理人的才能或公司的經營績效? 當其就業機會很高時,經理人獎酬是否隨著市場指標而改變? 此時經理人是否會放棄利用盈餘管理來操縱股價,其並不會期望利用股票選擇權的執行來獲利?(2) 經理人獎酬的大幅增加通常有部分來自意外收穫,亦即經理人變得更加富有部分是牛市引起的。因此,本研究擬驗證經理人運氣較佳或市場繁榮時,經理人獎酬是否將隨著市場指標而改變? 此時經理人是否放棄利用盈餘管理來操縱股價,而不需從股票選擇權的執行來獲利?(3) 驗證經理人運氣下降或績效下降時,經理人獎酬是否因而大量減少? 此時經理人是否有可能為了避免被更換,採用盈餘管理來操縱股價,並從股票選擇權的執行來增加財富?

Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that because the exercise price ofstock option is set at the stock market price at award date, CEOs may delay favorableearnings announcements and rush announcing adverse information prior to the option awarddate in order to reduce stock price and increase intrinsic value of stock options. Wasley andWu (2006) indicate that there has been a dramatic increase in the issuance of managementcash flow forecasts, and the number of such forecasts has more than tripled since 2000. Ingeneral, executives have incentives to supply voluntary disclosures, such as cash flowforecasts, to signal good news about firm performance and bring about the needed adjustmentof investors』and analysts』expectations. Kasznik and Lev (1995) indicate that voluntaryexecutive earnings forecasts are likely to convey bad news. This implies executives areconcerned with the litigation risk and thus issue preemptive earnings forecasts to causeinvestors to adjust their expectations downward. In most cases, when a firm has a higheroverall level of disclosure, including both voluntary and compulsory disclosures, it is lesslikely for the executives to manipulate the timing of information release and perform earningsmanagement. However, executives have higher incentive to manipulate stock prices whenthey possess a large quantity of option awards.Bartov and Mohanram (2004) show that there are positive abnormal earnings before themanagers exercise stock options and negative abnormal earnings after they exercise stockoptions. The implication is that management owns private information regarding futureearnings and makes profit from this information asymmetry. If managerial disclosure caneffectively lower the cost of external fund, we can expect that the higher the overall level ofdisclosure is, the less incentive for the executives to make profit from timing the signalrelease and manipulating earnings. Moreover, Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) find thatthe goal of stock option awards is to retain new employees and reserve capital for futuregrowth for new economy firms. Hence, the main research purposes in the first year are:(1) To examine whether the CEO times the cash flow forecast after the stock option awarddates and whether the CEO discloses both cash flow forecasts and earnings forecasts toincrease the intrinsic values of stock options.(2) To examine whether the firms with cash flow forecast disclosures have more favorablecash flow news and better performance than the firm without disclosure, and whether neweconomy firms and young firms use more voluntary disclosure to signal good news.(3) To examine whether overall level of disclosure influences the external financing cost andgrowth of the firm, and whether managers make use of the disclosure policies to performearnings management and manipulate stock price.On the other hand, both academics and practitioners (for example, Bertrand andMullainathan,, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Rappaport,1999) indicate that the largeincrease in pay is in part a windfall, resulting from a bull market. Bertrand and Mullainathan(2001) show that executive pay is sensitive to exogenous forces, for example, luck. Agencytheory indicates that executives should be paid based on a benchmark to remove the effects ofmarket. However, some studies suggest that it is difficult to have a benchmark. This isbecause executives can set compensation based on pay for luck or pay for performance,depending on whichever is favorable to them. Oyer (2004) suggest that benchmarking is notobserved in compensation because the outside opportunity values of CEOs are sensitive tomarket. The CEOs』market opportunities are up when the market is up, and they will quit ifthe firm attempts to benchmark them. Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), and Oyer (2004)suggest that if CEOs』reservation pays are associated with outside employment opportunities;this reservation pay for preventing CEO quit will vary with economy states. In this case, it isoptimal if the firm does not have relative performance evaluation. In other words, althoughagency theory indicate that the firm should index executives compensation to removemarket-wide effects, that is, to remove relative performance evaluation, some studies supportthat the firm should pay more compensation to retain talented executives in the boom period.Hence, the research purposes of the second year are:(1) To examine whether CEOs』outside employment opportunities are associated with theirtalent and firm performance and whether CEO compensation varies with market indexwhen the opportunities are high? In this case, whether CEOs forgo employing earningsmanagement to manipulate stock price and do not try to serve self-interest whenexercising stock option.(2) In general, when there is a large increase in CEO compensation, a part of thecompensation increase arises from windfall, that is, the CEO is riding a bull market.Therefore, this research will examine whether CEO compensation varies with the marketindex. In this case, whether the CEOs do not employ earnings management to influencestock price when they exercise stock option.(3) To examine whether CEO compensations will significantly decrease when the CEO』s luckand/or talent is down. Under this case, whether CEO employs earnings management toavoid being replaced, and to increase wealth through exercising stock option awards.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/55393
其他識別: NSC96-2416-H005-020-MY2
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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