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|標題:||Financial Statement Quality, Equity-Based Executive Compensation, Big 4 Auditor Choice and Managerial Legal Liability Coverage
Recent accounting scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, put manager liability in thespotlight. From 1997 to 2005, Black, Skarzynski, and Walsh & Black LLC (2009) indicatedthat the average number of securities complaints filed against directors and officers ofpublicly traded corporations had ranged from 189 to 270, averaging approximately 230actions filed each year. According to 2008 NERA Report, the average size of securitiesclass-action settlements continued to increase. Eliminating settlements over $1 billion, theaverage settlement in 2007 was $31 million and the average settlement in 2008 was $29million. Both of these average figures exceeded the annual average settlement for every yearsince 1996. In light of these numbers, it should not be surprising that such litigation hasbecome almost routine, and D&O liability insurance plays a large role in handling it.From end of 1990s, D&O insurance first became available in Taiwan. With theincreasing number of claims against corporations and large settlements, D&O insurance hasbecome an important protection for directors and officers when named as defendants. Sincethe Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC) established in 2003, they hasdealt with 57 class-action cases and more than 60,300 plaintiffs required a total compensationamount about US $0.9 billion as of the end of 2008 (SFIPC 2008 annual report). Also, theirsuccess in winning compensations for the investors in these cases marks a significant step thatTaiwan has made in its efforts for investor protection. This legal environment changed in theearly 2000s which resulted in the sharp increase of D&O insurance demand for listedcompanies.In order to enhance transparency of corporate governance, Taiwan securities regulator,Taiwanese Securities and Futures Bureau (hereafter referred to as TSFB) required listedcompanies to disclose available more information on the D&O insurance purchases since it isa part of the managers' compensation package. This publicly available data provides us with asetting to investigate purchase of D&O insurance purchases arising from managerialincentives in Taiwan. The three project topics for each year are as listed follows:(1) First year research topics: the project will investigate whether equity-based executivecompensation and managerial legal liability coverage affect the occurrence ofearnings management.(2) Second year research topics: the project will investigates associations betweenaccounting restatements and managerial legal liability coverage.(3) Third year research topics: the project investigates association between D&Oliability insurance purchase and auditor choice.
近年來公司會計舞弊事件頻傳，例如恩隆和世界通訊等公司，各界已關注公司經理人的法律責任。根據Black, Skarzynski, and Walsh & Black LLC (2009) 調查指出自1997年至2005 年來，有189 件至270 件對公司董監事和經理人等管理階層訴訟的案件，大約每年平均為230 件。另外NERA Report(2008)指出證券投資人集體訴訟案件的求償金額逐年增加，過去這幾年來訴案件總和解金額高達10 億美元，而平均每一訴訟案件和解金額在2007 年和2008 年兩年就高達3 千1 百及2 千9 百萬美元。這已經遠超過以往平均和解金額的數字。在未來因證券訴訟而引起的案件將會成為常態，此時董監事暨經理人(D&O)保險將扮演非常重要的角色。自 1990 年代末期，D&O 保險逐漸引進台灣市場。由於近年來投資人對公司管理階層訴訟案件與和解金額逐年增加，故購買D&O 保險成為保護管理階層重要的策略。在2003 年投資人保護中心成立後，至2008 年止，該中心已處理了57 件證券投資人集團訴訟案件，超過60,300 投資人向公司D&O 求償高達9 億美元。此一法律環境的改變，造成台灣上市公司購買D&O 保險的數量逐年增加。為了加強台灣上市公司治理透明度，證券主管機關「證期局」要求上市公司揭露購買D&O 保險之資訊。由於此一公開之資料能夠提供我們檢測管理當局購買D&O 保險的動機。本研究將分成三年分別探討相關研究議題包括：(1) 第一年議題：本計畫將檢測經理人權益酬勞和管理當局法律責任對盈餘管理的影響。(2) 第二年議題：本計畫將檢測會計報表重編和管理當局法律責任保險關聯性。(3) 第三年議題：本計畫將檢測會計師選擇和管理當局法律責任保險關聯性。
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