Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/79706
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dc.contributor.author翁仁甫zh_TW
dc.contributor.author梁雅婷zh_TW
dc.contributor.other國立中興大學農業經濟研究所zh_TW
dc.date2012-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-13T07:43:29Z-
dc.date.available2014-06-13T07:43:29Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11455/79706-
dc.description.abstract鑒於過往關於資訊不對稱下的環境管制分析,皆未將環境管制當局可採取延遲 (delay) 策略,做為管制政策工具的可能性納入討論的範圍。本研究擬擴展Boyer and Laffont (1999) 的當事-代理 (principal-agent) 環境管制分析架構,將政府環境管制當局可 以採取延遲策略,做為其環境誘因管制 (environmental incentive regulation) 工具的可能性 納入考慮,建構一個考慮延遲策略的環境誘因管制模型,進行政府環境誘因管制措施的 福利與經濟影響效果分析,zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe past environmental regulation analyses under asymmetric information often disregard the possibility that environmental regulatory authorities may take the delay strategy as regulatory policy tool. This research will construct a model of environmentalen_US
dc.language.isozh_TWzh_TW
dc.publisher臺中巿:國立中興大學農業經濟研究所zh_TW
dc.relation應用經濟論叢, Issue 91, Page(s) 197-221._TW
dc.subjectEnvironmental incentive regulationen_US
dc.subject環境誘因管制zh_TW
dc.subjectDelayen_US
dc.subjectIncentive theoryen_US
dc.subjectPrincipal-agent modelen_US
dc.subject延遲zh_TW
dc.subject誘因理論zh_TW
dc.subject當事-代理模型 modelzh_TW
dc.title納入延遲策略下的政府環境誘因管制分析zh_TW
dc.typeJournal Articlezh_TW
item.languageiso639-1zh_TW-
item.openairetypeJournal Article-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.grantfulltextrestricted-
item.fulltextwith fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
Appears in Collections:第91期
農業經濟研究所
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