Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
標題: 面對零售商競爭下,是否引入自有品牌?
Should retailers create the private brands when they are competitive?
作者: Kun-Han Hai
關鍵字: store brands;national brands;brand assortment;competing retailers;自有品牌;全國性品牌;品牌組合;競爭零售商
引用: 中文部分 魏啟林. (1993). 策略行銷. 英文部分 Choi, S. C. (1991). Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer. Marketing Science, 10(4), 271-296. Choi, S. C. (1996). Price competition in a duopoly common retailer channel. Journal of Retailing, 72(2), 117-134. Dunne, D., & Narasimhan, C. (1999). The new appeal of private labels. Harvard Business Review, 77, 41-54. Ghosh, A. (1990). Retail management: Dryden Press Hinsdale, IL. Hoch, S. J. (1996). How should national brands think about private labels. Sloan Management. Ingene, C. A., & Parry, M. E. (1995). Channel coordination when retailers compete. Marketing Science, 14(4), 360-377. Iyer, G. (1998). Coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition. Marketing Science, 17(4), 338-355. McGoldrick, P. J. (1984). Grocery generics—An extension of the private label concept. European Journal of Marketing, 18(1), 5-24. McMaster, D. (1987). Own brands and the cookware market. European Journal of Marketing, 21(1), 83-94. Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. The Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286-295. Nash Jr, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 155-162. Quelch, J. A., & Harding, D. (1996). Brands versus private labels: fighting to win. Harvard Business Review, 74(1), 99-&. Raju, J. S., Sethuraman, R., & Dhar, S. K. (1995). The introduction and performance of store brands. Management Science, 41(6), 957-978. Sayman, S., Hoch, S. J., & Raju, J. S. (2002). Positioning of store brands. Marketing Science, 21(4), 378-397.
In the past of the time, we can see many national brands on the shelf at different kinds of store. But there are few store brands on the selling market. But now, store brands stand out conspicuously. We can observe the convenient store or some distributors start to develop their store brands. The bargaining power of store brands are getting stronger, manufactures have to help them to produce their products or they may lose profits. The relationship between store brands and national brand are competitive but they still cooperate at some situations.
The study concluded that retailers entrust manufactures to produce store brands. And retailers introduce store brands to sell at their own sales channels. Under this situation, how do wholesale price, retail price and sales quantities change? Adding the level of the substitution and the brands preference of consumers to evaluate the consequence of the equilibrium.
The conclusion of the study: (1) On the comparison of wholesale price. After introducing store brands, no matter competing retailers or own channel are not necessary to drop price. When customers prefer to buy store brands, wholesale price will be higher probably. (2) On the comparison of retailer price. After introducing store brands. When customers prefer to buy store brands, the price of national brands will be higher probably. (3) After introducing store brands, the sales quantities of national brands will drop at any condition. (4) There are 9 subgames on this game. But only 7 are equilibriums. When one channel sells national brand and the other sells store brands will not be an equilibrium.

Rights: 同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,2016-06-09起公開。
Appears in Collections:企業管理學系所

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat Existing users please Login
nchu-104-7101023028-1.pdf1.69 MBAdobe PDFThis file is only available in the university internal network    Request a copy
Show full item record

Google ScholarTM


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.