Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92379
標題: 中國上市公司政治關係與權益資金成本
Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital in China
作者: Joo-Chyang Lim
林裕強
關鍵字: 政治關係;權益資金成本;Political Connections;Cost of Equity
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摘要: 
本文以中國上海證交所上市公司為樣本,探討公司高管之政治關係與權益資金成本。研究發現與以往文獻的結果符合,與無政治關係的公司相比之下,有政治關係的公司享有較低的權益資金成本。此外還發現,若公司高管曾擔任過政府官員且職級越高,其對權益資金成本存在降低成本的效果,尤其是於規模較大之公司擔任的董事長。再者,無論是國營企業或非國營企業,規模較大的公司之政治關係對權益資金成本都擁有較強的影響力。

In this essay, I investigate the association between top executives political connections and the cost of equity capital using a sample of firms listed on Shanghai stock exchange. This essay finds that politically connected firms have a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected counterparts, which is consistent with prior literature. I also find that when executives have been government officials, especially with higher ranks, the firms exhibit a lower cost of equity capital, especially lower for chairman with the higher ranks of civil servants and in larger firms. Moreover, my results suggest that the effect of political connections is stronger in larger firms regardless of types of ownership.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92379
其他識別: U0005-1006201516525000
Rights: 不同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務
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