Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
標題: 銀行往來關係與公司股權結構對長期貸款授信條件之影響
The Effect of Lending Relationship and Enterprise's Ownership Structure to the Long Run Loan Terms
作者: Yu-Hsiu Cheng
關鍵字: 長期貸款;授信條件;銀行往來關係;股權結構;long run loans;loan term;bank lending relationship;enterprise's ownership structure
引用: 一、 中文文獻 李婉慈(2000),銀行往來關係與公司經營績效及財務危機之關聯性分析,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文.。 呂靜芬(2008),銀行往來關係對授信條件影響之研究,中興大學企業管理學系所學位論文1-47.。 杜玠瑤(2012),台灣企業的借款利差與利差變動之研究,中央大學財務金融學系學位論文1-76. 陳安琳、李文智、周士雄(1999),銀行存放款利率差距因素之研究。 陳盈樺(2000),台灣地區銀行與企業融資關係之探討─ 主力銀行機制,銘傳大學金融研究所碩士論文。 陳家彬、江惠櫻、賴怡洵(2003),商業銀行對企業授信決策考量因素與授信品質之關係,管理評論22(2)、1-23。 陳彥芝(2011),往來密切程度對企業借款利差與資本投資之影響,中央大學財務金融學系學位論文1-71。 許竣棠(2014),影響企業貸款利率高低之因素分析,臺灣大學國際企業學研究所學位論文1-75。 黃慶堂、汪志勇、董沿(2011),中小企業與銀行往來關係對其授信條件之影響,中小企業發展季刊第21期。 蔡佩真(2000),公司成長、資本結構與公司績效之研究---以台灣上市公司為例,國立清華大學經濟學所未出版碩士論文。 蘇容瑩(2006),銀行利差決定分析,淡江大學經濟學系碩士班學位論文1-50。. 二、英文文獻 Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 31(03), 377-397. Agarwal, R., & Elston, J. A. (2001). Bank–firm relationships, financing and firm per-formance in Germany. Economics Letters, 72(2), 225-232. Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. the Journal of Finance, 55(1), 81-106. Athavale, M., & Edmister, R. O. (1999). Borrowing relationships, monitoring, and the Influence on loan rates. Journal of Financial Research, 22(3), 341-352. Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1995). Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance. Journal of business, 351-381. Bhattacharya, S., & Chiesa, G. (1995). Proprietary information, financial intermediation, and research incentives. Journal of Financial Intermediation,4(4), 328-357. Bharath, S. T., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A., & Srinivasan, A. (2009). Lending relationships and loan contract terms. Review of Financial Studies, hhp064. Blackwell, D. W., & Winters, D. B. (1997). Banking relationships and the effect of monitoring on loan pricing. Journal of Financial Research, 20(2), 275-289. Blackwell, D. W., Noland, T. R., & Winters, D. B. (1998). The value of auditor assur-ance: Evidence from loan pricing. Journal of accounting research, 57-70. Boot, A. W., & Thakor, A. V. (1994). Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game. International Economic Review, 899-920. Boot, A. W., & Thakor, A. V. (2000). Can relationship banking survive competi-tion?. The journal of Finance, 55(2), 679-713. Boot, A. W. (2000). Relationship banking: What do we know?. Journal of financial in-termediation, 9(1), 7-25. Boot, A. W., Thakor, A. V., & Milbourn, T. T. (2002). Evolution of Organizational Scale and Scope. Boot, A. W., Thakor, A. V., & Milbourn, T. T. (2002). Sunflower management and cap-ital budgeting. Boubakri, N., Guedhami, O., Mishra, D., & Saffar, W. (2012). Political connections and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(3), 541-559. Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997). Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of corporate Finance,3(3), 189-220. Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith, C. W. (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of financial economics, 20, 267-291. Brick, I. E., & Palia, D. (2007). Evidence of jointness in the terms of relationship lend-ing. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(3), 452-476. Byun, H. Y., Choi, S., Hwang, L. S., & Kim, R. G. (2013). Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt. Journal of Corporate Finance, 23, 311-331. Campbell, T. S. (1979). Optimal investment financing decisions and the value of confi-dentiality. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 14(05), 913-924. Charumilind, C., Kali, R., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2006). Connected Lending: Thai-land before the Financial Crisis*. The Journal of Business, 79(1), 181-218. Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M., & Patel, A. (1999). Bank monitoring and the pricing of corporate public debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 435-449. Degryse, H., & Van Cayseele, P. (2000). Relationship lending within a bank-based sys-tem: Evidence from European small business data. Journal of financial Intermedia-tion, 9(1), 90-109. Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2002). Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(7), 1373-1406. Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. The Re-view of Economic Studies, 51(3), 393-414. Diamond, D. W. (1989). Reputation acquisition in debt markets. The journal of political economy, 828-862. Diamond, D. W. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. Journal of political Economy, 689-721. Elsas, R., & Krahnen, J. P. (1998). Is relationship lending special? Evidence from cred-it-file data in Germany. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(10), 1283-1316. Faccio, M. (2010). Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross‐country analysis. Financial Management, 39(3), 905-928. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The journal of polit-ical economy, 288-307. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control.Journal of law and economics, 301-325. Fama, E. F. (1985). What's different about banks?. Journal of monetary econom-ics, 15(1), 29-39. Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 1095-1102. Fohlin, C. (1997). Relationship banking, liquidity, and investment in the German indus-trialization. Liquidity, and Investment in the German Industrialization (December 16, 1997). Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial management, 101-112. James, C. (1987). Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans. Journal of financial economics, 19(2), 217-235. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005). Unchecked intermediaries: Price manipulation in an emerging stock market. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(1), 203-241. Longhofer, S. D., & Santos, J. A. (2000). The importance of bank seniority for rela-tionship lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 57-89. Lummer, S. L., & McConnell, J. J. (1989). Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements. journal of Financial Economics, 25(1), 99-122. Mak, Y. T., & Li, Y. (2001). Determinants of corporate ownership and board structure: evidence from Singapore. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(3), 235-256. Miller, M. H., & Rock, K. (1985). Dividend policy under asymmetric information.The Journal of finance, 40(4), 1031-1051. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of financial economics, 20, 293-315., R., Mobarak, A. M., & Purbasari, D. P. (2006). Do multinational corporations seek out po-litically connected firms. Working Paper, Firm Level Evidence on Local Partner Search by Multinational Corporations. Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of financial eco-nomics, 13(2), 187-221. Ongena, S., & Smith, D. C. (2001). The duration of bank relationships. Journal of Fi-nancial Economics, 61(3), 449-475. Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small business data. The journal of finance, 49(1), 3-37. Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight.Journal of financial economics, 20, 237-265. Prevost, A. K., Rao, R. P., & Hossain, M. (2002). Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Empirical Fi-nance, 9(4), 373-397. Ramakrishnan, R. T., & Thakor, A. V. (1984). Information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation. The Review of Economic Studies, 51(3), 415-432. Rajan, R. G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm's‐length debt. The Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1367-1400. Santos, J. A., & Longhofer, S. D. (1998). The importance of bank seniority for rela-tionship lending (No. 58). Bank for International Settlements. Sapienza, P. (2004). The effects of government ownership on bank lending.Journal of financial economics, 72(2), 357-384. Sharpe, S. A. (1990). Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: A stylized model of customer relationships. The Journal of Finance, 45(4), 1069-1087. Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of financial economics, 20, 293-315. Singh, M., & Davidson III, W. N. (2003). Agency costs, ownership structure and cor-porate governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), 793-816. Smith, C. W., & Warner, J. B. (1979). On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of financial economics, 7(2), 117-161. Sudip, D., Mai, I. D., & Ajay, P. (1999). Bank monitoring and the pricing of corporate public debt1. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 435-449. Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of financial Eco-nomics, 20, 431-460. Yafeh, Y. (2000). Corporate governance in Japan: Past performance and future pro-spects. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 16(2), 74-84.

This study's purpose is analyzing which affect long-term relationship loan term from two perspectives, bank lending relationship and enterprise's ownership structure. In the bank lending relationship perspective, there's new variable to analyze, share of wallet, which is loan amounts company borrowing from the specific bank divided by from all banks. This ratio could be used to measure the loan concentration of the company or exclusive of the bank. Besides, studies in Taiwan about enterprise's ownership structure always focused on company value, company achievement or the cost of debt. This study start from bank loan term,
The result is when the share of wallet is higher, the cumulate time contacting with the specific bank is shorter, the percentage of the board of directors and supervisors holding is higher, the percentage of the financial institutions holdings is higher, and the percentage of Taiwan government holding is higher, the long-term loan terms are better.
其他識別: U0005-2906201522211000
Rights: 同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,2018-07-08起公開。
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat Existing users please Login
nchu-104-7102021029-1.pdf712.69 kBAdobe PDFThis file is only available in the university internal network    Request a copy
Show full item record

Google ScholarTM


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.