Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92433
標題: 董事會規模與董事會獨立性對董事薪酬與高階經理人薪酬的影響
The Effects of Board Size and Board Independence on Board Compensation and Manager Compensation
作者: Chia-Jung Hu
胡珈榕
關鍵字: 董事薪酬;高階經理人薪酬;董事會;Director compensation;Manager compensation;Board
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摘要: 
2008年發生金融危機後,許多金融機構接受政府的紓困,但卻將紓困金以紅利與獎酬發放給員工,「肥貓」議題逐漸浮出檯面,有關薪酬的公司治理議題於現今社會逐漸受到重視。
本研究欲探討董事會組成對董事薪酬與高階經理人薪酬的影響,以2005年至2011年在台灣上市上櫃公司作為研究樣本,並將研究樣本分為單一家族主導公司與非單一家族主導公司(再細分為共治型態主導公司、公股主導公司與專業經理人主導公司);董事兼任經理人公司與董事無兼任經理人公司;再依據不同公司規模將樣本區分為五個群組(Size1、Size2、Size3、Size4與Size5),目的在於探討董事會規模與獨立性對董事薪酬與高階經理人薪酬的影響。
本研究實證結果顯示董事會規模對董事薪酬呈負相關;董事會規模對高階經理人薪酬呈正相關;董事會獨立性對董事薪酬呈負相關;董事會獨立性對高階經理人薪酬呈正相關。

After the 2008 financial crisis, many financial institutions have been condemned of rewarding their employees by the received bailouts from the government. As a result, 'Fat cat' issue has gradually come to the surface; and the compensation system of a corporation has been regarded as a priority in today's society.
This study examines the effects of the composition of the board on compensation system of the board of director and managers. The sample of the study is drawn from the listed companies from 2005 to 2011 of the Taiwanese companies and OTC companies. The sample has been examined with three comparisons. First, we divided sample into family-run and non-family-run business, and subdivide non-family-run business into association, government and manager companies. Second, we group the companies in which their directors can also behave as the managers. Third, we put the companies into five groups according to different companies' operation scales (Size1, Size2, Size3, Size4 and Size5).
The findings suggest that the amount of the members in the board has a negative impact on the compensation system; however, it has a positive effect on compensation system for managers. Besides, the independence of the board is negatively related with its compensation system, but board independence has positive effects on that of manager compensation.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92433
其他識別: U0005-1605201409511900
Rights: 不同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所

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