Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92435
標題: 金融海嘯對於盈餘管理方式之影響
The Influence of Financial Crisis on Earnings Management
作者: Wei-Shan Cheng
鄭瑋姍
關鍵字: 盈餘管理;金融海嘯;裁決性應計項目;實質盈餘管理;earnings management;financial crisis;discretionary accrual;real management
引用: 林宜勉、王韶濱、陳世良,2004,會計方法選擇與盈餘管理:以折舊方法為例。會計與公司治理,第一卷第一期,73-94頁 朱家賢,2011,達到分析師盈餘預測門檻之盈餘管理行為─以中國上市公司為例。 潘琪茹,2011,2008年金融風暴後企業盈餘管理之研究。 陳旭東,2011,金融風暴與企業盈餘管理之研究。 Abhijit, Barua, Steve Lin, and Andrew M. Sbaraglia, 2010, Earnings Management Using Discontinued Operations. The Accounting Review, 85, 1485-1509. Anne, Beatty L., Bin Ke, and Kathy R. Petroni, 2002, Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines across Publicly and Privately Held Banks. The Accounting Review, 77, 547-570. Burgstahler, D., and Ilia Dichev, 1997, Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, 99–126. Cahan, S., 1992, The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals: A refined test of the political-cost hypothesis. The Acounting Review, 67, 77–95. Cheng, Qiang, T. Warfield, and M. Ye, 2011, Equity Incentives and Earnings Management: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 26, 317-349. Cohen, Daniel A., Aiyesha Dey, and Thomas Z. Lys, 2008, Real and Accrual‐Based Earnings Management in the Pre‐ and Post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley Periods. The Accounting Review, 83, 757-787. Cohen, Daniel A., and Paul Zarowin, 2010, Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management Activities around Seasoned Equity Offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 2-19. DeAngelo, 1986. Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Review, 61, 400–420. Dechow, P. M., R.G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney, 1995. Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 70, 193- 225. Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, A. P. Sweeney, 1996, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13, 1-36. Defond, M. L. and J. Jiambalvo, 1994, Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 145-176. DeFond, M. L., and C. W. Park, 1997, Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, 115–139. Drew, F., and J. Tirole, 1995, A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents. Journal of Political Economy, 103, 75-93. Dopuch, N., and R.W. Holthausen, R.W. Leftwich, 1986, Abnormal stock returns associated with media disclosures of 'subject to' qualified audit opinions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8, 93-117. Elizabeth, S. McVay, 2006, Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting: An Examination of Core Earnings and Special Items. The Accounting Review, 81, 501-531. Graham, John R., Campbell R. Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal, 2005, The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40, 3–73. Gunny, K., 2005, What Are the Consequences of Real Earnings Management? Hayn, Carla K., 1995, The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 125–153. Healy, P. M., 1985. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decision. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 85-107. Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen, 1999, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting. Accounting Horizons, 13, 365-383. Hirshleifer, D., S. S. Lim, and S. H. Teoh, 2009, Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News. The Journal of Finance, 64, 2289–2325. In-Mu, Haw, Simon S.M. Ho, and Annie Yuansha Li, 2011, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management by Classification Shifting. Contemporary Accounting Research 28, 517-553. Islam, Md. A., R. Ali, and Z. Ahmad, 2010, Is Modified Jones Model Effective in Detecting Earnings Management? Evidence from A Developing Economy. Journal of Economics & Finance, 3, 116-125. Jones, J. J., 1991. Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 193-228. Kasanen, E., J. Kinnunen, and J. Niskanen, 1996, Dividend-based earnings management: Empirical evidence from Finland. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22, 283–312. Lin Anchor Y., Ching-Lung Chen, and Pei-I Chou, The Effect of Real Activity Earnings Management on Price Valuation Implication. Moehrle, S. R., 2002, Do Firms Use Restructuring Charge Reversals to Meet Earnings Targets? The Accounting Review, 77, 397-413. Rangan, S., 1998, Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 101–122. Robert, W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker, and Richard G. Sloan, 1995, Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, 29-74. Robert, W. Holthausen, and R. Leftwich, 1983. The economic consequences of accounting choice implications of costly contracting and monitoring, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5 (2), 77 - 119. Schipper, K., 1989, Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 3, 91–102. 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摘要: 
本研究以2004年至2012年之美國上市櫃公司為樣本,分別以裁決性應計項目與實質性活動兩類盈餘管理方式,探究金融海嘯期間內之盈餘管理行為是否異於非金融海嘯期間,並研究在不同樣本期間內,影響盈餘管理程度之因素是否存在差異。
盈餘管理之趨勢圖分析顯示,企業在金融海嘯期間內會傾向減少以裁決性應計項目對盈餘進行管理,但實質性盈餘管理之程度會更勝以往,因此本研究推論裁決性應計項目與操弄實質活動間存在替代關係。本文進一步藉由獨立樣本T檢定之結果驗證本文利用趨勢圖所作之推論,檢定結果與前述推論相符。
此外,針對不同樣本期間內,影響盈餘管理程度因素之研究顯示,當公司追蹤之分析師人數愈多,無論以裁決性應計項目或實質活動衡量盈餘管理,其盈餘管理程度皆會顯著降低。另一方面,實質活動盈餘管理與企業之B/M ratio在三段期間中均呈現顯著負相關,而就財務槓桿程度變數而言,在金融海嘯期間前,財務槓桿程度較高之樣本,其實質性盈餘管理之程度較高;但在金融海嘯期間後,財務槓桿程度較高之樣本,其實質性盈餘管理之程度反而會較低。

This paper aims to investigate whether earnings management behavior during global financial crisis is different from the non-financial crisis period. We use discretionary accruals and real activities earnings management to measure the magnitude of earnings management respectively.
In the trend charts, the managers of enterprises tend to reduce the magnitude of earnings management by discretionary accruals but the magnitude of earnings management by real activities would increase and more than ever. Therefore, we infer that there is a substitution relationship between discretionary accruals and manipulation of real activities. This study test further the inference by two-sample t-test, the resultis consistent with the former.
Moreover, we also explore whether the factors of earnings management indistinct sample period are different. Empirical results demonstrate that no matter what manner we measure the magnitude of earnings management, the number of analysts who tracing the enterprise is more, the magnitude of earnings management is less. Furthermore, in the period before the financial crisis, sample with higher financial leverage, its magnitude of earnings management is higher. On the other hand, in the period after the financial crisis, sample with higher financial leverage, then its magnitude of earnings management is lower.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92435
其他識別: U0005-2006201409580000
Rights: 同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,2016-06-30起公開。
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所

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