Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92563
標題: 家族企業與盈餘透明度之關聯性
The Association between Family Firms and Earnings Transparency
作者: Hung-Chen Chen
陳虹蓁
關鍵字: earnings transparency;family firms;information asymmetry;盈餘透明度;家族企業;資訊不對稱
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摘要: 
Using the explanatory power of the returns-earnings relation as the proxy of earnings transparency, this study examines the association between earnings transparency and family firms. In addition, independent directors and CPA-related variable were entered into the model to examine the effects of external monitoring mechanism on the above association. Empirical data of listed and OTC companies were obtained from the TEJ data from 2006-2013. Empirical results indicate that family firms' earnings transparency is higher than that of non-family firms. When the ratio of family shareholdings is higher, earnings transparency is higher. This is probably because family firms can reduce the agency problem between business owners and management, although as such, the agency problem between controlling shareholders and other shareholders can exacerbate. Taken as a whole, family firms' agency problems are smaller than non-family firms'. In other words, family firms' information asymmetry is smaller than non-family firms'. Moreover, if the proportion of independent directors in the board is higher, earnings transparency is higher. And the higher the industry specialization is, the higher earnings transparency is. These could be due to the independence of the independent directors and CPAs that could effectively restrict managers' behavior.

本研究利用盈餘報酬迴歸式之調整後解釋力衡量盈餘透明度,探討家族企業與盈餘透明度之關係,並加入獨立董事與會計師變數,以考量外部監督的效果。以2006年至2013年國內上市櫃公司為研究對象,本研究實證結果發現家族企業的盈餘透明度較高,也就是說相較於非家族企業,家族企業的資訊不對稱程度較低;而家族持股比例愈高時,盈餘透明度愈高。其主要原因可能在於家族企業能降低經營者與管理者的代理問題,即使因此可能擴大控制股東與非控制股東的代理問題;但整體而言,家族企業的代理問題仍然較小,衍生出的資訊不對稱程度較低。另外,本研究也發現獨立董事席次比例愈高、會計師產業專精度愈高時,盈餘透明度也愈高,這與獨立董事及會計師具獨立性較能約束管理者的行為有關。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92563
Rights: 不同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務
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