Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92572
標題: 盈餘透明度對代理成本的影響
The Effects of Earnings Transparency on Agency Costs
作者: Jo-Hua Ho
何若華
關鍵字: Earnings transparency;Agency costs;Firm size;Industry specialization;Industry competition;盈餘透明度;代理成本;會計師事務所規模;會計師產業專家;產業競爭程度
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摘要: 
This research uses free cash flow as a proxy to examine the relationship between earnings transparency and agency costs as well as the moderating effects of CPA firm size, industry specialization, and industry competition on the above relationship. Empirical data of listed and OTC companies were obtained from the TEJ data bank from 2008-2013. Empirical results indicate a negative correlation between earnings transparency and agency costs; hence, companies with higher earnings transparency can improve the problem of information asymmetry, which would decrease agency costs. On the other hand, our research also proves CPA firm size to be a negative moderator between earnings transparency and agency costs, which means when a company is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm, the higher auditing quality of Big 4 firms can improve information asymmetry. Moreover, industry specialization is also a negative moderator between earnings transparency and agency costs; this indicates that industry specialization can improve information asymmetry. This study contributes to the existing literature of earnings transparency and agency costs, and findings of this study show a negative relationship between earnings transparency and agency costs.

本研究以公司自由現金流量作為代理成本之替代變數,以探討公司代理成本與盈餘透明度兩者之間的關係;除此之外,也加入會計師事務所規模、產業專家、產業競爭程度作為調節變數,以探討是否會影響代理成本與盈餘透明度間的關係。本研究以2008年至2013年之上市櫃公司為研究對象,實證結果顯示,盈餘透明度與代理成本兩者呈現顯著負相關;代表當公司盈餘透明度較高時,能夠改善管理當局與外部投資人之間資訊不對稱的情況,進而降低公司的代理成本。另外一方面,本研究進一步發現事務所規模有助於提升盈餘透明度與代理成本間的負向關聯;意即當公司由四大會計師事務所查核時,由於審計品質較高,能夠改善資訊不對稱的問題。此外,產業專家亦有助於提升兩者間的負向關聯,即產業專家所查核的企業,能夠改善資訊不對稱的問題,進而加強盈餘透明度與代理成本之負向關係。本文結果除了加強盈餘透明度和代理成本相關方面的研究,也發現盈餘透明度與代理成本間的呈現負向關係。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92572
Rights: 不同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務
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