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An Elimination of Pei-Rong Fu's Challenge of the Innate Goodness of Human Nature
|關鍵字:||人性本善;儒學;傅佩榮;Human nature is innately good;Confucianism;Fu Pei-Rong||出版社:||臺中市：國立中興大學中國文學系||Project:||興大中文學報, Volume 37, Page(s) 303-330.||摘要:||
As the most authoritative interpretation of Confucian theory of human nature, the view that human nature is innately good has never confronted with a grave challenge in the long history of Chinese thought. The following are questions that are rarely asked: What is it meant by the phrase renxing ben shan or ＂human nature is innately good?＂ How can this thesis be justified? Should it be not taken for granted that the goodness of human nature is compatible with desires, given the teachings of Confucians? It seems so reasonable that, until the questions above are answered, we can be said to have no duty to take the existence of innate goodness as one of our beliefs. Beyond the influence of contemporary Neo-Confucianism, which dominates the interpretation of traditional Confucian philosophy, Pei-rong Fu, who belongs to the minority taking a critical attitude toward Confucianism, provides a comprehensive review for Neo-Confucian approval of the innate goodness, arguing that it is wrong to interpret xingshan as renxing ben shan, and that it is impossible to confirm such a theory in our everyday life. Whether Fu's criticisms are successful or not, what he has discussed can be considered an access to an re-examination of the expression of renxing ben shan, by which we are able to form a clearer concept of its connection with issues including the distinction between human nature and morality, the compatibility between goodness and badness, as well as the feasibility of moral cultivation.
|Appears in Collections:||第37期|
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